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Race is commonly assumed in the popular imagination to be an antique notion, a vestige 
of pre-modern or at least not adequately modernized social assertions and arrangements. I 
have written extensively against this understanding in earlier work. I want here to extend 
this frame of analysis by outlining a more or less recent turn in at least one regionally 
prompted, parametered, and promoted racism linked to its dominant state formation in the 
case of the United States as well as to its contemporary imperializing expressions beyond 
the national borders. This is part of a wider concern of mine, aimed at outlining a set of 
more or less recent typologies of regionally registered racisms linked to their dominant 
state formations.1 I am suggesting regional models or mappings, rather than ideal types, 
broad generalizations as contours of racist configuration, each one with its own material 
and intellectual history, its prior conditions and typical modes of articulation. They are 
often interactive historically, overlapping landscapes. But it remains nevertheless 
revealing to delineate them, to distinguish one kind and style from another in terms of 
differences in their conditions of possibility, expression, effects, and implication. 
Identifying these mappings in the name of the social places and spaces of their principal 
origination, historical manifestation, and regional articulations is not to limit the (partial) 
influence of their logics and effects on other places, spaces, and regions that might not be 
readily identified with their coordinates of origination. Racisms have a history of 
traveling, and transforming in their circulation. What I register here as more or less 
discrete in order to identify their socio-material and intellectual conditions of emergence, 
logics, social manifestations, effects, and implications are in practice interactive with 
each other at various times and places on the ground and across borders and oceans. 
In this scheme of things I identify five dominant mappings linked to different, if 
neither perfectly isomorphic or absolutely discrete, spatio-historical conditions and 
expressions. These prevailing modalities include americanization, palestinianization, 
latinamericanization, europeanization, and south africanization of racism, and by 
extension of race. This order reveals what would otherwise more likely go unnoticed, that 
each represents a significance that is both historically resonant and politically dominant at 
specific global conjunctions, but also a logic of their historical interaction one with 
another. I am concerned here with a detailed focus on the historical logic of “racial 
americanization,” as much for the way it comes to embody the emergence of “born again 
racisms” I have elaborated elsewhere, as for its own historical significance. Racial 
americanization projects itself as the model, the one to be emulated, the failure of which 
bears more significant costs than in each of the other, if related, instances. 
Classic racisms were formed and fashioned in the contexts of European 
expansion, enslavement, and colonization. They were the racisms of self-proclaimed 
European superiority in pursuit initially of new sources of wealth, a servile labor supply, 
exotic goods. Over time, however, this came to include expansive territorialization, 
settlement, globalizing dominance, and with these processes emerged the possibilities 
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even of new lives for the settlers and new forms of desire, but also dominance, 
degradation, even death for those thus made servile. The prevailing geographies of early 
modern racisms then—until at least the later eighteenth century—are projected as 
Europe’s externality, the colonial outside, provincial extensions vested largely in the rural 
slaveries of plantation life. Here, the viciousness of the violent structures necessary to 
uphold the system were hidden just beneath the tranquil facade of settlement: wars, 
seizures, chains and whippings, deathly ships, disease, human auctions, but also the 
penning of dehumanizing rationalizations, Sunday sermons, and state edicts. In these 
classic expressions of racism, race was seen always as a disruption, as the invader, as the 
outsider asserting itself over, or inserting itself into, local homogeneity.  
Racism’s more modernizing modes in the wake of abolition and nineteenth 
century industrialization, by contrast, are increasingly associated with urbanization and 
metropolitan life. Modern cities have traditionally been places of migratory attraction and 
moral repulsion, offering the lure of employment and recreational excitement, 
consumptive novelties and cultural development, radical possibility and intense 
anonymity. It is this radical heterogeneity that has served at once as magnet and threat, as 
appealing, even as transgressive of conserving inhibition, and so at once repulsive. The 
perceived threats to homogeneity, to the reproduction of sameness and identity, to the 
expected and the usual, to order and control, with which cities are associated historically, 
prompted the institution of controls over urban space including formal restrictions on 
entry, movement and access. Thus it is in cities that the perceived “need,” the demand, 
for racial segregation was hardened, if not initiated, becoming the principal sites of 
formalized segregating institutionalization. Late in the nineteenth century, concerns over 
control of urban space became the summary motivation and purpose of the drive by 
whites to segregate--namely, to restrict heterogeneity and hybridity, to delimit 
intercourse, to control interaction and relation. This was seen as especially compelling in 
the Anglo-settler societies, most notably America and South Africa, but also in Australia. 
Segregation emerged as the dominant and formalized modality of racism in the 
United States as freed slaves moved off the plantations and into cities, first southern, and 
then up the Mississippi and the east coast, and, ultimately, westward. White politicians in 
the southern Democratic Party machine secured their political power by shielding the 
white urban working class from competition by newly emancipated blacks in the late 
nineteenth century just as the National Party came to power in South Africa in 1948 by 
securing the wellbeing of the white working and poor classes on the promise of apartheid. 
The ghettoized segregation widely associated with the height of American racism was a 
thoroughly urbanized post-Reconstruction development, the full effects of which were 
realized in cities in the 1920s and 1930s, by which time it was being thoroughly contested 
by black social movements.  
If what we have come to recognize as standard American racism took the cruel 
form of a constitutionalized segregation (accompanied by the cultivating ethnocide of 
assimilating what was left of American Indians), contemporary racial americanization has 
informalized apartness, rendering it the effect of privatized preference schemes rather 
than explicitly institutionalized legalities. Increasingly today, members of different ethno-
racially constituted groups – whites, blacks, Latinos, Chinese, Vietnamese, Cambodian, 
Indian, and Arab Americans – have come “by choice,” principally the choices of whites, 
to occupy discrete urban spaces, at first different neighborhoods but now overwhelmingly 
different municipalities, different cities. The choices have been shaped by policy and law 
to order social opportunities for some while closing them down for others, streaming 
access in the former case while plugging it up in the latter. This reveals how preferences 
are molded even as that discriminate sculpting is obviated, rendered obscure and 
indiscernible in the name of its claimed obsolescence. 
Black migration from the south coincided with European immigration to cities 
like New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. But it was coterminous as well as with 
Chinese and Japanese settlement, especially in San Francisco, and Chicano migration to 
Southern California and later across the Southwest to join those already long settled as a 
result of earlier American territorial annexations. But just as racial interaction began to 
increase, African Americans, Latinos, and Asians were becoming progressively 
segregated within cities. The more black urbanization expanded, the more their racial 
segregation and restriction within cities was extended. Thus by 1930, the spatial location 
of segregation already had transformed perceptibly from regional to neighborhood 
divides. Until the late 1800s nearly ninety percent of black Americans lived in southern 
rural counties, while almost that proportion of whites lived in northern cities. By 1930 
black urban residents tended to live in wards 40 percent black. From 1890 to 1930 black 
residence in New York surged nearly tenfold from 36,000 to 328,000, in Chicago over 
twenty fold from 14,000 to 234,000. Chicago neighborhoods, which had been just 10 
percent black in 1900, were swept by the cold wind of segregation into neighborhoods 
which would become 70 percent black just 30 years later.2 By 1950, a majority of African 
Americans had become city folk, and by 1960 a greater percentage of blacks than whites 
lived in cities. Between 1920 and 1980 blacks living on the land and working in 
agriculture declined 96 percent, and by 1981 this figure had almost disappeared, to one 
percent.3 )  
Already in 1940 ethnic white neighborhoods were far from uniform in their ethnic 
composition. Neighborhoods in which blacks or Latinos lived tended much more to be 
overwhelmingly black and Latino. Identifiably “Irish” areas of cities included just three 
percent of the total Irish population, and most of New York’s Italians did not live in Little 
Italy, for instance. By contrast, 93 percent of blacks lived in neighborhoods that in the 
categorical formation of race in the United States can be characterized as majority black. 
The construction and containment of Chinatowns within major metropolitan centers at 
precisely the same time reinforces the ethnoracial logic at work here. Thus the conditions 
for the reproduction of European immigrant ghettoes have never existed in the way they 
did in the twentieth century for African American and Chinese ghettoes. European 
immigrant segregation ebbed as their migration flow waned, while black segregation 
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within the boundaries of confined black and Chinese space increased and intensified not 
primarily as a result of black housing preferences, but of conscious white avoidance, as 
manifested in the use of physical violence, intimidation, and the creation of a dual 
housing market by way of racial covenants and the like. So white exposure to blacks was 
still self-determinedly minimized through ensuring black isolation in urban ghettoes. 
Cities became instruments for European immigrant group advancement, but became sites 
in which blacks especially were blocked from integrating not only residentially but 
educationally and economically also. Chinese entrepreneurship was left to flourish within 
the strict confines of Chinatowns, linked as it was to external sources of capital formation 
in Asia that had no equivalent for black ghetto dwellers. 
The post World War II period saw the emergence of nationalized desegregating 
efforts – in the Army, the courts, on the streets, in buses and schools – prompted not only 
by moral and internal political imperatives, but also by geopolitical Cold War 
competition and assertive local mass mobilization. The “national interest” and foreign 
policy demands necessitated public commitment to race neutral governmentality. On the 
face of it, the federal government also made a huge commitment to producing much 
needed urban public housing in 1949, when it authorized 810,000 new units over six 
years4 which led, in fact, to the federal government becoming engaged in reproducing 
segregation. With the postwar modernization boom fueling the economy, federal policy 
initiatives regarding mortgages and taxes promoted the suburban housing explosion for 
middle and working class whites, while federal property appraisal policies rendered 
possible bank and mortgage company redlining of inner city property purchase and 
development. Government, national and local, massively promoted private 
(re)development and gentrification of CBDs by underwriting loans at the same time when 
incentives to redevelop inner cities by building housing for the urban poor were almost 
wholly absent. By 1962 only 320,000 of the public housing units promised in 1949 
(roughly 40 percent) had been constructed.5 Much more inner city housing in fact was 
bulldozed away in terms of the 1949 federal housing law than was actually built, creating 
premonitions of “group areas” apartheid South Africa. From the end of World War II 
until 1960, less than two percent of new housing financed by mortgages guaranteed by 
federal insurance went to black homeowners.6 From about 1950 on, then, segregation 
across and not just within cities began to increase. By the 1980s, this trend had become 
evident as members of ethnoracially defined and identified groups were increasingly 
inhabiting not just in different neighborhoods from whites, but different cities.7 Their 
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children likely attended overwhelmingly segregated schools in different school districts, 
growing up literally not knowing each other besides through the stilted stereotypical 
images they gleaned from television . 
At the very time of growing desegregation in the public sphere, one could say 
there was publicly subsidized resegregation in the private sphere. Desegregation never 
stood a chance. By 1980, Massey and Hajnal have calculated, blacks living in cities 
found themselves in municipalities on average 35 percent black. If black and white 
residents were to be evenly distributed across municipalities, 50 percent of blacks in 
cities would have to switch places of residence with whites.8 It is revealing to note that 
such calculations somehow are invariably made on the dislocating assumption that 
blacks, not whites, should move, Owen Fiss being simply the most recent to promote 
such a plan.9 The suburban explosion that pulled whites out of the cities transformed the 
countryside into sprawling suburbs. These suburbs eventually became small self-
governing cities, the effect as much of the desire to be politically and fiscally autonomous 
from deteriorating old black-identified cities as of some purely administrative rationality. 
In 1950 there were no central cities in the US that were overwhelmingly or even 
largely black, and no city with a population larger than 100,000 had a majority black 
population. Forty years later there were 14 such cities, including Atlanta, Baltimore, 
Detroit, Gary, New Orleans, and Washington. Eleven more cities had black populations 
between 40 and 50 percent, including Cleveland, St Louis, and Oakland. Among cities 
larger than 25,000 in 1950 just two had majority black populations, a number that had 
exploded to 40 by 1990.10 Interestingly, the increase in segregation after mid-century is 
characteristic only of larger cities with large black populations. There was a noticeable 
decline in segregation in small cities with small black populations. In the latter cases, 
African Americans found themselves assimilated into dominant white space with little or 
no noticeable effect on prevailing urban arrangements or culture. By the end of the Civil 
Rights era, in contrast, geographic isolation of blacks in larger urban settings--the 
overwhelming majority of black folk--was nearly complete.  
In a provocative thought experiment in 1971, Thomas Schelling11 exemplified the 
segregating implications effected through personal preference. (Schelling uses a 
checkerboard with dimes and nickels, although I think the coloring of the chess pieces 
more provocative.) Take a chess board: Fill 10 percent of its spaces with black pawns; fill 
70 percent of its spaces with white pawns. Assume each black pawn wants at least one 
neighbor to be a black pawn, and each white pawn wants at least one neighbor to be a 
white pawn. Segregation sets in within a couple of moves (try it). If each wants both 
neighbors to be like itself, segregation is produced all the more quickly. So, rational 
                                                 
8 Massey and Hajnal, 536-37. 
 
9 See Owen Fiss, A Way Out: America’s Ghettos and the Legacy of Racism (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2003). 
 
10 Massey and Hajnal, op. cit., p 537. 
 
11 Thomas Schelling, "On the Ecology of Micromotives," The Public Interest 25 (Fall 
1971): 61-98. 
 
choice theorists to the contrary, preferences are not naive, discursively unstructured, 
simply given, or unchanging. Preferences are ordered by the dominant discursive culture 
and terms. In the case of the preference for segregated space, segregation is discursively 
(re)produced and ideologically massaged. White Americans of all class stripes reportedly 
prefer to live in neighborhoods which are at least 80 percent white; black Americans 
prefer to live in neighborhoods which are 50 percent white (which is to say 50 percent not 
white). Given that those classified white make up over 70 percent of the population, that 
leaves vast areas of possibility for all white areas. The age of late twentieth century 
deregulation prompted a spreading, expanding segregation, one less formally imposed by 
law than the old activist segregation but produced via the informalities of private 
preference schemes. 
Nancy Denton has demonstrated the debilitating effects of such segregation 
thus.12 Take a city, not unrealistically, that is 25 percent black or Latino with a white 
poverty rate of 10 percent and a black or Latino poverty rate of 20 percent. Absent 
segregation, the neighborhood poverty rate is 12.5 percent (whites make up three-quarters 
of the population). Where segregation is complete, the neighborhood poverty rate for 
blacks or Latinos becomes 20 percent. Where class segregation intersects, the multiplier 
effect on the neighborhood poverty rate of poor blacks or Latinos doubles it to 40 
percent. In the face of economic downturns, the black or Latino poverty rate jumps from 
20 to 30 percent. The black or Latino neighborhood poverty rate then would double to 60 
percent. That means almost two-thirds of the people in the black or Latino neighborhood 
would live in poverty. The same logic applies to predominantly segregated towns or 
cities. This perhaps is a major underlying reason why, according to a Los Angeles Times 
report,13 two-thirds of new immigrants to the United States claim to be “white” on the 
U.S. census no matter ethnoracial background. White, it turns out, is thought to identify 
what it means to be American, with the assimilative logic of “fitting in,” that is, with 
opportunity and access, with getting ahead and succeeding. If California is the leading 
edge of trends in the US, the desert communities stretching from east of Los Angeles to 
the Arizona border exemplifies these divides. The areas west of Palm Springs are home 
to retired whites living in gated communities on artificial lakes spending their days on 
golf courses kept green by water piped in from the Colorado River dividing California 
from Arizona. East of Palm Springs the terrain dries quickly into dusty desert sand, 
garbage dumps, toxic sewage cesspools. They are home to a population overwhelmingly 
of Mexican immigrants not yet citizens, barely out of their teens and speaking little if any 
English whose drastically devalued labor makes possible the lifestyle of those to the west. 
Prompted by a mix of fear, restricting potential competition, and cementing 
power, whites could enthusiastically embrace the ideological shift at the middle of the 
last century from assimilation to pluralism. Pluralism is experienced as the commitment 
not only to different histories, cultural values and practices but also to the ideological 
cliché of “live and let live.” This legitimated contrasting urban conditions, and, by the 
same token, set the stage for the abandonment of certain city spaces. The libertarian 
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license to “live and let live” is stressed so long as one doesn’t get in the way of 
institutionalized americanization, at home or abroad. Racial americanization in this 
context includes nominal commitment to liberty, individualism, market economies, 
private property and profit, but also historical denial of or disregard for others’ suffering 
and concerns, of one’s own privilege and self-assertion. 
 Old segregationist racism, from post-Reconstruction to Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954)14, thus was an activist segregation produced for the most part by an 
active intervention in politics, economics, law, and culture self-consciously designed to 
produce segregated city, town, and neighborhood spaces. To combat this activism, the 
Civil Rights Movement likewise found itself called to action in every dimension. The 
period from post-World War II to the 1970s, by contrast, was one of tension and 
contradiction, promise and projection, expectation and elevation, denial and dashed hope. 
It was a period of desegregating commitment and the seeds of a resegregating 
mobilization. The logic of the old segregation supposedly was swept aside, only to be 
replaced by the whisper of the new, the subtle and silent, the informal and insidious. This 
newly expressed segregation, the newly privatized segregation at the heart of what I am 
characterizing as the model of racial americanization, is one no longer activist (at least at 
home) but conservative, a segregation in the literal sense conservationist. 
Racial americanization thus proceeds not simply by reducing the social to the 
preferential, the state to (in)civil society. Preferences are not expressed, enacted, and 
experienced in a political and institutional vacuum. Rather, public spheres – and the state 
especially – structure the conditions of possibility in which choices are to be made, 
preferences pushed and indeed in some cases punished. State structures channel, shape, 
and mould both the boundaries and terrain of choice making and implication, and 
preferences expressed and enacted reinforce existing state formation even as inflecting 
and coloring them. 
This conservationist segregation, the model of racial americanization, proceeds 
by undoing the laws, rules, and norms of expectation the Civil Rights movement was able 
to effect, attacking them as unconstitutional, as the only sort of racial discrimination with 
which we should be concerned today! Racial americanization embraces race neutrality 
even as it licenses “limited” racial profiling for purposes of security maintenance, 
targeted policing, and medical research as legitimate for combating the moral panics of 
terror, socially or naturally initiated. In the absence of the Civil Rights spirit, and now in 
its active dissipation, accordingly, the present period conserves (and deepens) the hold of 
racial preference schemes historically produced as if they were the nature of things. So 
racial americanization is produced by a mix of doing nothing special, nothing beyond 
being guided by the presumptive laws of the market, the determinations of the majority’s 
personal preferences, and the silencing of all racial reference, with the exception of racial 
profiling for purported purposes of crime and terror control. This silencing fails to 
distinguish between exclusionary racist designs and practices, on the one hand, and 
redressive or ameliorative racial interventions, on the other, reducing the latter to the 
former as the only contemporary racist expressions worth worrying about. The libertarian 
pluralist motto of “live and let live” at once licenses a surplus of possibility and 
opportunity for the affording few at the expense of the impoverished many. It might more 
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accurately be replaced with the New Hampshire state motto, “live free or die,” implying 
that those who cannot afford the freedom will be left to perish. Histories forgotten, 
activist interventions restricted (save for pointed exceptions), the racial status quo 
(re)fixed in place, at home and now increasingly abroad. 
In this mode, the current commitment by fundamentalist fiscal radicals to de-fund 
social programs such as education, health care, popular culture and the arts through 
extreme forms of tax reduction, while increasing military and prison budgets brings 
public funding to the point of bankruptcy. And as with personal or corporate bankruptcy, 
it forces a radical restructuring of public programming and state-fashioned 
governmentality. The immediate implication is that wealth is redistributed upwards even 
as “social” spending is redirected into private hands in such a fashion as to serve the 
social and political interests of those with capital. So private (toll) roads, the recent 
emergence of private electrical grids in the face of blackouts, privatization of funding for 
radio stations, policing functions (at least supplementally), certainly schools and in some 
instances such as Philadelphia entire school districts, hospitals, and universities (even 
public ones) are thrown increasingly into the hands—and so at the discretion of—those 
who can afford and choose to support them. The effect is not that all funding support for 
public programming ends, but that funding for almost anything other than explicit 
behavioral control programs (policing, militarization) becomes pointedly privatized, thus 
directed by the hidden hand and so serving the supposed interests of the wealthy with 
disposable income or investment capital.  
Now the elevated factions of social class in a racial state like the U.S. have 
traditionally been white, or, more precisely, have represented the interests of those 
occupying the structural class position of (male) whiteness. The US Census Bureau 
reports that in 2000 the top five per cent of white wage earners received wages almost 
double those of the top five percent of black wage earners. Unsurprisingly, the largest 
contributors by far to political campaigns are white men. Under this mandate of radical 
privatization, funded institutions, programs, and activities accordingly become 
dramatically less diverse in their programming, scope, commitments and, moreover, in 
their employment patterns. Hence the fundamentalist conservative outrage expressed by 
the likes of Abigail Thernstrom, Ward Connoly, Linda Chavez, and the Center for 
Individual Rights regarding the Supreme Court’s recent upholding in Grutter v. Bollinger 
(2003)15 of law schools’ limited affirmative action programs for the sake of maintaining a 
diverse student body. Neo-conservative critics committed to a “race-free” America (note, 
not racist free) have blasted the diversity commitments of the Court’s majority as 
“tortured” (Ward Connerly), as “diversity drivel” (Michael Greve), and discriminatory 
(Linda Chavez), indeed, even “racist” (Abigail Thernstrom).16 If it is no longer possible 
to restrict demographic diversity, the culture wars can be won by defunding progressive 
cultural commitments, by shrinking the cultural horizons of heterogeneity. 
Implicit in this model of racial americanization, therefore, is a set of barely stated 
assumptions and presuppositions. First, homogenized apartness is taken as the 
deracialized norm, the assumed, the natural, the given. Integration, or at least 
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desegregation, comes over as unnatural, literally absurd and irrational in the prevailing 
order of things, requiring intervention by the state at the cost of liberty (the freedom to 
choose where one lives or is educated, who one hires or works with, where one hangs 
out, worships or may be laid to rest). Second, standards are represented mainly as white, 
that is, those associated with the structure of whiteness, which are assumed as the norm, 
as the criteria of judgment, as representing excellence – as what everyone else should 
aspire to. Third, whites are projected as the real victims of antiracist excess (of leftist 
antiracist racism, of political correctness, of liberal soft-headedness, of the ideology of 
egalitarianism). And finally, those committed to affirmative action, those against the 
undoing of antiracist protections and for vigorously heterogeneous public culture, are 
chided by the agents of rational choice and unfettered individual preference – by racial 
americanists, in other words – as the cultural elites (the very terms Bob Dole used to 
knock Democrats in his acceptance speech for the Republican nomination in the 1998 
Presidential election), out of touch with the “real” concerns and interests of “real,” 
everyday, working – that is, street wary and weary white people. 
But racial americanization is not simply a movement looking to local conditions. 
Where it is self-conscious, racial americanization has come to combine domestic with 
foreign design. In the wake of 9/11, americanization became exportable to those 
ethnoracially conceived countries or (sub-)continents deemed to threaten its security. The 
conservationism of domestic racial americanization has been supplemented by an activist 
agenda regarding externalities, one that has redounded on the fragilities of the domestic 
mandate in unsettling ways. Domestically, as we have seen, the commitment is supposed 
to be to homogenizing racelessness as the rejection of “diversity drivel,” where the 
civilizing standards are those of heteronormative, homogenizing whiteness. By extension, 
ethnoracial rationalization as civilizational superiority is readily invoked in the war on 
terror and exported as the neo-libertarian imposition of “living free,” which means 
buying (into) the American dream of privatizing (i.e. corporatizing) national industries, 
promoting cutthroat competitiveness, reproducing a culture of possessive individualism, 
allowing for the freedom to choose (ultimately to starve), and of unsettling the status quo 
in favor of US-friendly puppets. The foreign extension of racial americanization returns 
racial configuration to externalities internalized, to race as the outside threat of 
heterogeneous diversity, as the perceived activist need to reinvent a segregationist logic 
on an ethnonationalized global scale. Rogue states, those pre-modern avatars of 
repressive unfreedom or chaotic anarchy, are the new targets of opportunity. Until the 
American Dream of “living free” is internalized in those civilizational places most 
resistant to it—notably societies seen to be ordered by the terrors of assertive Islam—
they need to be quarantined, segregated into containable and controllable cantons, 
movement of human and economic capital to and from them constrained and conditioned, 
filtered and sterilized lest they infect the land of modern liberty.  
Muslims are the new niggers of this globalizing racial americanization. And given 
that transnational flows are less readily containable and conditioned than they were a 
century ago, this newly necessitated activism has redounded back on the American 
“homeland” (how much more an ironically inverted historical invocation of racially 
conceived place can one get?). The circulation of terror today knows no borders or 
boundaries. The dictates of national security have been internalized in the form of 
“homeland security,” at once identifying the transnational uncontainability of an 
ethnoracially conceived people elsewhere (Muslims everywhere, all two billion, 
worldwide) into a more strategically manageable grouping (Arabs) geo-graphically 
locatable in a single, if extended, region (the Middle East). The transmutations of geo-
strategic national and localized homeland securities into each other have a double dictate: 
On one hand, wherever they might be, the terrorists must be eradicated, no matter the 
collateral damage, or failing that at least kept at bay (though given the need to protect 
global interests, American presence in any bay has become a vulnerable target). 
Collateral damage, as Mahmood Mamdani has pointed out17, is “not an unfortunate 
byproduct of war; it was the very point . .” of terrorizing the general population into 
submission, a logic destined to bite back the hand that feeds it, as the Iraqi debacle of 
“Operation Enduring Freedom” is illustrating on a daily basis. That freedom is to be 
“endured” reveals something of the ironies at work here. It reveals, on the other hand, 
that the uncivil must be civilized, educated where at all possible in the virtues of the 
American way, all the while keeping them at arm’s length least they bite back, which 
they invariably do. The logic of domination, of enduring freedom, dictates it. 
This ambivalence between embracing and distancing, between paternalistic rule 
and the segregative security state, is mirrored by the ambivalence towards racial 
profiling. Prior to 9/11, racial profiling in the U.S. especially by the police was being 
rolled back in the face of widespread public consensus that it was unworkable and unjust. 
Post 9/11, public opinion had swung dramatically, seventy percent supporting profiling as 
a means to effect security in the homeland. One third of people polled in the U.S. 
responded that all Arab Americans ought to be interned as a bulwark against potential 
terrorism. Think of it: sixty years after World War II, every third non-Arab American one 
might come across in a random public place in America was ready to round up their Arab 
American compatriots in a concentration camp. Paul Gilroy is right at least in this: the 
resonances of fascism die hard.18 President Bush’s executive order clarifying his 
administration’s policy on racial profiling seeks to capitalize on these tensions. Banning 
profiling by federal law enforcement agents for “routine law enforcement investigations,” 
the order nevertheless enables the use of race and ethnicity in “national security” 
(including all border) considerations as well as in cases where “trustworthy information” 
exists identifying specific criminal activity or membership of a criminal organization. So 
while police cannot target a neighborhood because of its racial composition, border patrol 
can stop a person on the basis of a racial profile, race can be used to “identify terrorist 
threats, and stop potential catastrophic attacks,”19 and federal agents can stop racially 
identified suspects in a particular crime where they claim to have clear evidence that the 
perpetrator fits the racial profile. Clearly, this executive order on racial profiling will 
have no diminishing effect on the racially driven rates of incarceration in America where 
people of color, barely totaling 30 percent of the general population, make up more than 
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and Terrorism,” American Anthropologist 104.3 (2002): 766-75. 
 
18See Paul Gilroy, Against Race (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
 
19 US Dept of Justice, Guidance Regarding the Use of Race by Federal Law Enforcement 
Agencies (June 2003). 
 
70 percent of the spiraling prison population.20 Racially driven incarceration, in fact, is a 
cornerstone of the logic of born-again segregation. The almost random rounding up of 
Arabs is a predictable extension of this logic. President Bush’s profiling policy thus 
exemplifies the logic of racial americanization perfectly well: appear to strike racial 
reference from formal public dictate while endorsing its covert extension, in private and 
public interactions, especially in cases of national security. 
In terms of the institutionalization and reproduction of racial americanization, 
these new forms of segregation have managed to informalize what used to be formally 
produced, both to realize and virtualize segregative exclusions. Race continues to define, 
globally as domestically, where one can go, what one can do, how one is seen and 
treated, one’s social, economic, political, legal and cultural, in short, one’s everyday 
experience. Global circulation, like local city space, is increasingly contradictory: As 
there is greater heterogeneity and multiplicity so segregation is refined; as visible 
openness and accessibility are enlarged exclusionary totalization is extended; as 
interaction is increased access is monitored, traversal policed, intercourse surveilled. As 
boundaries and borders become more permeable, they are re-fixed in the imaginary, 
shifting from the visible to the virtual, from the formalized to the experiential, from the 
legal to the cultural at a time when the cultural, economically and socially, has become 
dominant. 
National security has become the abiding insomnia of American paranoia. Where 
segregation has been privatized along with much else in American life, its logic has come 
to dominate U.S. foreign policy. Segregation was never about the complete dislocation of 
one racially conceived group from another, a final solution of another sort, so much as it 
was conceived as a logic of ongoing control. Blacks were to be externalized from the 
social life of whiteness for all purposes other than menial services, demeaning labor, and 
sometime sexual experimentation or satisfaction. The logic in the case of the Middle 
East, and indeed now Africa, is of the same order. We will interact with you only in so 
far and for as long as you service national interests. But the history of segregating others 
reveals that it necessarily entails more or less extensively isolating oneself. Hence the 
lure to whites of Harlem at the heights of segregating America or of Sophiatown or 
District Six in apartheid South Africa. Racial americanization is about unilateral 
Americanism, a new global politics of going it alone because, in elevating oneself above 
all others, one is reduced to the paranoidly assertive insecurity of rendering oneself too 
sensitive to touch, thus literally untouchable. Targets of opportunity turn on their 
paternalists, once they figure out there are no free opportunities. This shriveling of 
possibility reduces the plaintive cry of freedom to turning the self-proclaimed father 
figure of America into targets. Racial americanization externalized is the fuel—and fear--
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